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Abstract
How does metaphysical necessity relate to the modal force often associated
with natural laws (natural necessity)? Fine (2002) argues that natural necessity
can neither be obtained from metaphysical necessity via forms of restriction nor of
relativization — and therefore pleads for modal pluralism concerning natural and
metaphysical necessity.
Wolff (2013) aims at providing illustrative examples in support of applying
Fine’s view to the laws of nature with specific recourse to the laws of physics: On
the one hand, Wolff takes it that equations of motion can count as examples of
physical laws that are only naturally but not metaphysically necessary. On the
other hand, Wolff argues that a certain conservation law obtainable via Noether’s
second theorem is an instance of a metaphysically necessary physical law.
I show how Wolff’s example for a putatively metaphysically necessary
conservation law fails but argue that so-called topological currents can nevertheless
count as metaphysically necessary conservation laws carrying physical content. I
conclude with a remark on employing physics to answer questions in metaphysics.
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1 Introduction
Generally speaking, laws of nature are either seen as at least partly metaphysically
necessary (necessitarian view1), or metaphysically contingent overall (contingentist
view2). But even if one denies that laws of nature obtain with metaphysical necessity, it
may be argued that there is nevertheless a particular sense of necessity pertaining to
natural laws (natural necessity).3
How do metaphysical and natural necessity relate then? Necessitarians would
generally regard any form of natural necessity as a specific form of metaphysical
necessity.4 The standard view on modality, however, renders what is metaphysically
necessary as also naturally necessary (with the converse not being true).5 This then
easily motivates the opposite restrictionist view on which metaphysical necessity is just
a special form of natural necessity (that is, on which metaphysical necessity and natural
necessity do not differ in kind but just in scope).6 Fine (2002) begs to differ in any case:
neither natural necessity can be reduced to metaphysical necessity nor metaphysical
1See Swoyer (1982), Shoemaker (1998), Ellis (2001), Fales (2002), and Bird (2005),
among others.
2See Fine (2002), Lowe (2002), among others.
3See Fine (2002), or Armstrong (2016), p. 83.
4See Shoemaker (1998), and Ellis (1999) (‘scientific essentialism’), for instance.
5See Kment (2017).
6See Lange (2007).
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necessity to natural necessity, or so he argues. What we have instead, is a modal
pluralism on which both metaphysical and natural necessity are independent notions.
It is in this context that Wolff (2013) aims at providing illustrative examples in
support of Fine’s modal pluralism by recourse to the laws of physics: On the one hand,
Wolff takes it that equations of motion can count as examples of physical laws that are
only naturally but not metaphysically necessary. On the other hand, Wolff argues that
a certain conservation law obtainable via Noether’s second theorem is an instance of a
metaphysically necessary physical law.
I show how Wolff’s example for a putatively metaphysically necessary conservation
law in the sense of Fine fails but argue that so-called topological currents do count as
metaphysically necessary conservation laws carrying physical content. Just like Wolff
originally intended, I thus provide illustrative support for the thesis that Finean modal
pluralism applies to physical laws in an interesting sense, and thus to the laws of nature
more generally. I conclude with a remark on employing physics to answer questions in
metaphysics.
2 Why Noether currents are not metaphysically necessary
Crudely speaking — following Wolff (2013) — there are two major approaches to
necessity (in addition to plain modal monism): Either (1) only one type of necessity
prevails albeit in degrees. Wolff (2013) calls this the degree view — it is for instance
promoted by Lange (2009). Or (2) necessity comes in different, mutually irreducible
species. Wolff calls this the species view ; in particular, Fine (2002) is a proponent of
this view. Given that the proponent of the species view believes that different sorts of
necessity are (generally) independent concepts, this position amounts to a “modal
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pluralism" (Fine, 2002). Note though, that, even on the species view, the necessity of a
certain species arguably might still prevail up to different degrees.
Fine (2002) identifies three species of necessity: metaphysical, natural, and normative
necessity which are — as he argues — not definable in terms of each other. In
particular, he dismisses attempts of rendering natural necessity as obtainable via what
is usually called relativisation or restriction from the notion of metaphysical necessity.7
In the following, we are mainly interested in the first two putative species as
conceived of by Fine:
• Metaphysical necessity is primarily presented by Fine as “the sense of necessity
that obtains in virtue of the identity of things" (Fine (2002), p. 236), that is their
essence, sometimes also referred to as ‘their nature’.8 ‘Things’ can refer to
7For this essay, I find the notions of relativisation and restriction to be best
illustrated by example: Assume for a moment that logical necessities are a subset of
conceptual necessities, and that the latter are in turn a subset of metaphysical
necessities in the Finean sense as introduced in the text below. Restriction then aims at
getting from the broader notion (metaphysically necessity) to the narrower notion
(conceptually necessity) by defining the proposition Q as conceptually necessary if and
only if it holds in virtue of the nature of certain concepts. Relativisation, on the other
hand, allows for defining a broader notion (conceptual necessity) from a narrower
notion (logical necessity): the proposition Q is conceptually necessary if and only if the
conditional “if P then Q” is logically necessary for some conjunction P of some basic
conceptual truths. See Fine (2002), and Kment (2017) for more details.
8Fine uses nature / essence / identity interchangeably. See also Michels (2019),
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objects, properties and concepts alike. Fine gives the example that an electron is
negatively charged in virtue of being an electron.
• Natural necessity is (loosely) circumscribed by Fine as “that form of necessity that
pertains to natural phenomena." (Fine (2002), p. 238). Fine gives the example of
a billiard ball hitting a (resting) second one in which case it is naturally necessary
that the second billiard ball moves in response to this collision.
Fine is a non-reductionist about essence, i.e. the notion of essence is a theoretical
primitive. In particular, essence should not be led back to modality — rather
metaphysical necessity is to be defined in terms of essence (see above). His reasoning
for taking essence to be a theoretical primitive runs as follows: we should stick to our
(supposedly) obvious intuition in denoting statements such as “It is true in virtue of the
nature of Socrates that he is an element of the singleton set {Socrates}."9 as false.
However, a modal reductionist view on essence10 runs exactly counter such intuitions.
As Fine (1994) states:
footnote 4 and 11.
9Other examples for statements which should count as false but follow as true from
a modal reductionist view on essence include: “It is true in virtue of the nature of any
object [= it is essential to any object] that it exists." or “It is true in virtue of the
nature of any object that Φ, where < Φ > is any metaphysically necessary proposition."
See Michels (2019).
10That is, a statement along the following lines: an object has a property essentially
if and only if it holds with a certain necessity.
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Consider, then, Socrates and the set whose sole member is Socrates. It is
then necessary, according to standard views within modal set theory, that
Socrates belongs to singleton Socrates if he exists; for, necessarily, the
singleton exists if Socrates exists, and, necessarily, Socrates belongs to
singleton Socrates if both Socrates and the singleton exist. It, therefore,
follows according to the modal criterion that Socrates essentially belongs to
singleton Socrates. (Fine (1994), p. 4)
That the notion of essence is a theoretical primitive, does not mean that it cannot be
clarified further. For this purpose, Fine (1995), for instance, distinguishes different
senses of essence, such as constitutive vs. consequential essence — “An essential
property of an object is a constitutive part of the essence of that object if it is not had
in virtue of being a [logical] consequence of some more basic essential properties of the
object; and otherwise it is a consequential part of the essence." — or mediate vs.
immediate essence — “One object will immediately depend upon another if it pertains
to the immediate nature of the other, while one object will mediately depend upon
another if it pertains to its mediate nature." I cannot give a complete account of Fine’s
notion(s) of essence, or his analysis of metaphysical necessity in terms of essence here;
instead, I follow Wolff in accepting Fine’s notions for the undertaking of exploring
whether they are of any good in the context of physics.11
11See Wolff (2013), p. 901:
For the remainder of the essay I will accept Fine’s notion of metaphysical
necessity, to see where it leads us. Is Fine right to claim that some laws of
nature are metaphysically necessary in this sense, and should we follow his
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The argument by Fine (2002) for why the notions of metaphysical necessity and
natural necessity are irreducible to one another can be roughly sketched as follows:
• Firstly, Fine argues that not all natural necessities are metaphysical necessities,
which means that one can neither obtain natural necessity from the restriction of
metaphysical necessity, nor metaphysical necessity by relativisation from natural
necessity. The standard argument to this effect runs as follows: Even though it is
arguably naturally necessary that mass attracts mass with an inverse square law,
this does not seem to render it metaphysically necessary (one would think that an
inverse cube law for the attraction between masses is as such metaphysically
possible).
Now, one might consider this argument to be blocked from a Kripkean-type
objection: It is arguably not the case that we are all still dealing with ‘mass’ in
these considerations above — rather, we are conceiving of “schmass”.
However, — as Fine shows — out of a straightforward counterexample and the
Kripkean-type objection, one can again build a new counterexample to the claim
that every natural necessity is also a metaphysical necessity: (1) Clearly, it is a
natural necessity that there is no schmass. (2) At the same time, whoever raises
the Kripkean-type objection must have accepted that the existence of schmass is a
metaphysical possibility.
• Secondly, Fine argues that one cannot obtain natural necessity from relativisation
with respect to metaphysical necessity: relativisation with respect to
assessment as to which laws those are?
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metaphysical necessity simply does not track all natural necessities. Consider
mass worlds, and schmass worlds. In particular, there is then an empty mass
world, and there is an empty schmass world. Although the same in terms of
properties, they are just not the same in terms of natural possibilities.12
Furthermore, even if a relativisation approach to natural necessity with respect to
metaphysical necessity did extensionally track all natural necessities, it would still
not work according to Fine:
Any true proposition whatever can be seen as necessary under the
adoption of a suitable definition of relative necessity. Any proposition
that I truly believe, for example, will be necessary relative to the
conjunction of my true beliefs and any proposition concerning the
future will be necessary relative to the conjunction of all future truths.
The problem therefore is to explain why the necessity that issues from
the definition of natural necessity is not of this cheap and trivial sort ...
(Fine (2002), p. 14)
• Thirdly, Fine argues that one could not obtain metaphysical necessity by
restriction from natural necessity even if it was granted that whatever is
metaphysically necessary is also naturally necessary — again making recourse to a
(supposedly) intuitive difference:
There appears to be an intuitive difference to the kind of necessity
12This is a slightly simplistic example, as Fine admits himself. See Fine (2002), §3 for
other, arguably stronger examples.
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attaching to metaphysical and natural necessities (granted that some
natural necessities are not metaphysical). The former is somehow
’harder’ or ’stricter’ than the latter.[FOOTNOTE SUPPRESSED] If we
were to suppose that a God were capable of breaking necessary
connections, then it would take more of a God to break a connection
that was metaphysically necessary than one that was naturally
necessary. (see Fine (2002), p. 26)
Needless to say, the above only captures the gist of Fine’s argument for modal
pluralism. As already the case with Fine’s notions of essence and metaphysical
necessity, I will accept Fine’s modal pluralism (his species view) about natural necessity
and metaphysical necessity, and so no further analysis of the argument will be given.
After all, this essay — just like that of Wolff (2013) — is first and foremost concerned
with the question whether Fine’s species view can be fleshed out under recourse to the
laws of physics.
So far, Fine’s only example for a putatively metaphysically necessary law (an
electron is negatively charged in virtue of being an electron) strikes Wolff more as a
(necessary) metaphysical proposition than a law. Wolff puts her complaint as follows:“
‘Electrons have negative charge’ seems a lot more like ‘sisters are female’ than like ‘F =
m a’. So this might not be, in fact, a case of a law of nature that is metaphysically
necessary but an example of a metaphysically necessary truth that happens to be about
certain kinds of particles but is not thereby any more a law of physics than the
proposition that sisters are female is a law of human biology." (p. 901) I agree with
Wolff that ’electrons have negative charge’ is a statement giving the identity/essence of
electrons and so is not a law. It is therefore just consequential that Wolff sets out to
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explore whether some of what we conceive of as laws in actual physics (such as
conservation laws) should count as metaphysically necessary (rather than (just)
naturally necessary). Wolff finds her example of a metaphysically necessary
conservation law in the form of a specific conserved current from electromagnetic gauge
theory then: Following Brading (2002), the conservation of this current can be derived
in several ways from the following Lagrangian of electromagnetic gauge theory
Ltotal = DµψD
µψ∗ −m2ψψ∗ − 1
4
F µνFµν , (1)
where Dµ = ∂µ + iqAµ, and the following (local) gauge transformation holds:
ψ → ψ′ = ψ exp(−iqθ), ψ∗ → ψ∗′ = ψ∗ exp(iqθ), Aµ → A′µ = Aµ + ∂µθ (θ is a function
of spacetime coordinates).
There are at least three (known) ways for arriving at the same conserved current;
most importantly, all three derivations require at least some equation of motion to hold.
I will now go through all three derivations to make this point clear. Less technically
interested readers can do without the following list of derivations, and continue with
the passage right after it.
(a) Deriving the equation of motion for Aµ gives ∂µF µν = jµ, where
jµ = iq(ψ∗Dµψ − ψDµψ∗).
(b) The second derivation builds on Noether’s first theorem:
If a continuous group of transformations depending smoothly on ρ
constant parameters ωk (k = 1, 2, ..., ρ) is a Noether symmetry group of
the Euler-Lagrange equations associated with L(φi, ∂µφi, xµ), then the
following ρ relations are satisfied, one for every parameter on which the
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symmetry group depends:
∑
i
(
∂L
∂φi
− ∂µ ∂L
∂(∂µφi)
)
∂(δ0φi)
∂(∆ωk)
= ∂µj
µ
k , (2)
where ∆ωk indicates that we are taking infinitesimal symmetry
transformations,
δ0φi =
∂(δ0φi)
∂(∆ωk)
∆ωk.”
(Brading (2005), p. 130)
From Noether’s first theorem — using the global symmetry of the Lagrangian,
ψ → ψ′ = ψ exp(−iqη), ψ∗ → ψ∗′ = ψ∗ exp(iqη), Aµ → A′µ = Aµ (η is a constant),
and the validity of the equations of motion — one arrives at the same conserved
current jµ as above.
(c) The third derivation builds on Noether’s second theorem:
If a continuous group of transformations depending smoothly on ρ
arbitrary functions of time and space pk(x)(k = 1, 2, .., ρ) and their first
derivatives is a Noether symmetry group of the Euler-Lagrange
equations associated with L(φi, ∂µφi, xµ), then the following ρ relations
are satisfied, one for every parameter on which the symmetry group
depends:
∑
i
(
∂L
∂φi
− ∂µ ∂L
∂(∂µφi)
)aki =
∑
i
∂ν{bνki(
∂L
∂φi
− ∂µ ∂L
∂(∂µφi)
)} (3)
(Brading (2005), p. 131)
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The infinitesimal transformation δ0φi is given by
δ0φi =
∑
k
{aki(φi, ∂µφi, x)∆pk(x) + bνki(φi, ∂µ, φi, x)∂ν∆pk(x)}.
From Noether’s second theorem — using the local gauge symmetry of the theory
— one obtains a relation between the fields Aµ and φ:
[∂L
∂ψ
− ∂ν
( ∂L
∂(∂νψ)
)]
(−iqψ) +
[ ∂L
∂ψ∗
− ∂ν
( ∂L
∂(∂νψ∗)
)]
(iqψ∗)
=∂µ
[ ∂L
∂Aµ
− ∂ν
( ∂L
∂(∂νAµ)
)] (4)
Requiring the equation of motion for Aµ to hold, ∂L∂Aµ − ∂ν
(
∂L
∂(∂νAµ)
)
= 0, this
relationship simplifies to:
[∂L
∂ψ
− ∂ν
( ∂L
∂(∂νψ)
)]
(−iqψ) +
[ ∂L
∂ψ∗
− ∂ν
( ∂L
∂(∂νψ∗)
)]
(iqψ∗) = 0 (5)
Plugging in the Lagrangian (1), allows for deriving a conserved current jµ as
above!
Concerning the last two derivations of the conserved current, Wolff notes that
“[...] the standard approach to conservation of electric charge in quantum
electrodynamics proceeds via Noether’s first theorem. Katherine Brading
has argued that while this approach is correct, it is also ‘subtly misleading’
(2002, 19). It is misleading because it obscures the fact that the conservation
of electric charge here does not depend on the satisfaction of particular
equations of motion but instead follows from the interdependence of matter
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and gauge fields. This interdependence can seem to look like the result of a
mere mathematical identity, which would suggest that the conservation law
holds in virtue of a mathematical truth, not in virtue of the details of the
‘real’ physics, that is, the particular equations of motion." (p. 904)
What Wolff leaves out here is that even in the derivation of the conserved current via
Noether’s second theorem (c), some equations of motion were used (namely that of Aµ).
It thus lacks any justification that Wolff subsequently presents the conserved current as
holding only in virtue of matter field relations, i.e. as holding just in virtue of the
identity of the fields involved (which — on Fine’s account — would indeed amount to
saying that they hold with metaphysical necessity). The conserved current simply
cannot count as metaphysically necessary as in all derivations above the conservation of
the current only holds under the assumption that some equations of motion apply.
More precisely, there are two options: on the first option, one simply accepts that
∂µj
µ = 0 is not a metaphysically necessary conservation law because (1) the
conservation law requires the equations of motion to hold, and (2) the equations of
motion themselves only hold with natural necessity. On the second, alternative option,
one counts ∂µjµ = 0 as metaphysically necessary nevertheless. But then also (some of)
the equations of motion would have to count as metaphysically necessary — the current
can after all only be conserved if these equations of motion hold as well. This is,
however, a highly unwelcome13 conclusion: If even the equations of motion are
metaphysically necessary, what could count as a metaphysically necessary law then in
13Not for those of course who take it that natural necessity should be subsumed
under metaphysical necessity (or vice versa).
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any interesting sense? Rather, all actual physical laws will now count as metaphysically
necessary.
So, either the conservation law put forward only holds with natural necessity just like
equations of motion are normally taken to do, or the conservation law and the
equations of motion both have to hold with metaphysical necessity. In both cases, what
was supposed to be an example for two independent species of necessity among the laws
of nature — metaphysical and natural necessity — in the end just suggests that
physical laws are of one and the same kind of necessity overall.
The derivation of a conserved (Noether) current in electrodynamic gauge theory is of
course only a specific case. I take the burden of proof to be on Wolff to show how any
other (non-trivial) Noether current could ever count as metaphysically necessary.
3 Topological currents as metaphysically necessary conservation laws
In the previous section, I demonstrated that Wolff’s example of a metaphysically
necessary conservation law is mistaken (it did depend on the validity of some of the
equations of motion). I now want to direct attention to a class of conservation laws —
the topological currents — which hold independently of the equations of motion and
thus, arguably, obtain in virtue of the identity of fields in an interesting sense.
Before we come to topological currents, it seems sensible to take a step back and
wonder what should count as determining a physical field’s identity / nature / essence
in the first place. For this, we can use the wide-spread kinematical / dynamical
distinction: A physical system is modelled by first setting up a state-space for a system
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(kinematical structure)14, and then imposing equations of motion (dynamical laws more
generally) for the elements of this state-space (dynamical structure).15 Consequently,
the nature of a physical field can then be seen as either determined at the (1)
kinematical level, or at the (2) dynamical level. On a kinematical take on field essence
(call this view kinematical essentialism), the essence of a field can be completely
determined through its individual properties such as its transformation properties (for
instance, are the fields represented by scalars, vectors, ... ?). On a dynamical take on
field essence (call this view dynamical essentialism), the essence of a field can only be
completely determined through the instantiation of a corresponding dynamical
equation. Grey-zone views in between a kinematical and a dynamical take on the
essence of a field seem possible, too: On a pre-dynamical take on field essence (call
views of this form pre-dynamical essentialist), certain dynamical properties of a field
(such as a specification of a certain coupling behaviour of one field to another) might
count necessary to completely determine the essence of a field — but never the
imposition of any concrete equation of motion.
In light of this kinematical / dynamical distinction, we can express our findings more
clearly then:
• A Noether current is not conserved in virtue of the kinematical nature of fields
alone but only in virtue of the dynamical nature of (some of) the involved fields.
• A list of interesting metaphysically necessary laws should only include all those
statements which hold in virtue of the pre-dynamical nature of physical fields.
14Such as phase space in classical, or Hilbert space in quantum mechanics.
15Such as fixing a specific Hamiltonian as the generator of time evolution.
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Metaphysically necessary laws which hold in virtue of the dynamical nature of
fields would comprise all actual physical laws as such. Given that dynamical
essentialism entails (metaphysical) necessitarianism about physical laws from the
outset, a project of looking for examples of metaphysically necessary laws among
physical laws would be unnecessary to begin with.
• Topological currents turn out to be conserved in virtue of the kinematical nature
of the fields alone, as it is demonstrated below. The assumption of kinematic
essentialism thus allows for an interesting case of metaphysically necessary laws in
physics — without risk of collapse of the position into metaphysical
necessitarianism. Note that kinematic essentialism itself is well motivated from
that physical theorising builds on a clear distinction between kinematical, and
dynamical facts.16
16This being said, it is of course conceivable that a pre-dynamical essentialist position
— which renders certain dynamical facts as part of the essence of a field that are
logically prior to the actual equations of motion — provides a more adequate
characterisation of the essence of fields than kinematical essentialism, and thus a more
plausible division of physical laws into metaphysically necessary and contingent ones.
However, I know of no general reason — neither from practice nor on more theoretical
grounds — why a pre-dynamical criterion of essence should be preferred over the
kinematical one. Rather, actual physical theorising seems to make a natural cut
between kinematical, and dynamical statements. Moreover, the attractiveness of certain
candidates for metaphysically necessary conservation laws from a kinematical
essentialist position — to be unfolded below — seems to speak against a more
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Following Vyas and Panigrahi (2014), define a topological current as a function of
spacetime coordinates, dynamical fields and derivatives of dynamical fields which is
conserved identically. In particular, it is conserved independently of whether the
equations of motion hold or not. Vyas and Panigrahi give the following examples of
topological currents:
• A nonrelativistic theory of bosons on a line, governed by a complex field ψ(x, t),
leads to the following topological currents:
(1) j0 = ∂x(ψ + ψ+), jx = −∂t(ψ + ψ+),
(2) j0 = −i∂x(ψ − ψ+), jx = i∂t(ψ − ψ+), and
(2) j0 = ∂x(ψ+ψ), jx = −∂t(ψ+ψ).
• A spinor field theory ψ(x) — as used to describe fermions — has the topological
current Jµt = ∂ν(Ψ¯σµνΨ).
• An abelian gauge field Aµ in 2 + 1 dimensions leads to the topological current
JµT = 
µνρFνρ.
We can note that the conservation of topological currents holds in virtue of the
identity of the fields, and thus, on Fine’s account of necessity, with metaphysical
necessity. At the same time, topological conservation laws are not empty of physical
content — they do not amount to mere mathematical identities — as they inherit
physical significance from their constituents (the fields and their derivatives). More
precisely, one can identify the empirical content of topological currents as follows:
restrictive, pre-dynamical essentialist view on essence.
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Classical currents are measurable since their constituents, the classical fields, are
measurable. Quantum currents17 amount to expectation values and thus form
correlation functions which can be measured as well. Consequently, the conservation of
topological currents amounts to a metaphysically necessary conservation law which does
contain measurable and thus physical content.
One could try to argue that topological currents are (like Fine’s electron example
criticized by Wolff) more similar to metaphysically necessary propositions about their
constitutive fields than to what one would like to call metaphysically necessary laws.
The only argument for this position I can think of would be to refer to the quasi-trivial
nature of these topological currents. What should rather count though when willing to
give the idea of metaphysically necessary law of physics a fighting chance, is that the
conservation statement for a topological current links different physical constituents
and (as a result of this) carries physical content while having the same form as other
conservation laws.
At this point one might ask why the relations in (4) holding between the fields
obtained from the local gauge transformations via Noether’s second theorem cannot
count as candidates for metaphysically necessary laws (albeit they are no conservation
laws). After all — the reasoning could go — these relations are true just in virtue of
the identity of the fields provided that one counts the transformation properties of the
fields as properties of the field.
However, as soon as one grants that the transformation properties are properties of the
fields, the relations (4) amount to nothing more than a direct re-expression of the
17See section 4 for more on conserved currents in the quantum context.
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identity of the fields otherwise (partly) encoded in the transformational properties
linked to them. That the gauge transformation mixes fields, after all means that the
redundancy in the representation of the theory is linked to treating the fields’ degrees of
freedom as more independent than they actually are. And it is simply this mutual
dependence in the very nature of the φ and Aµ fields which is made explicit in (4). This
said, it is then far from clear why such a more explicit depiction of the fields at play
should count as a law-like relation.
(Still, this all seems to suggest that the dividing line between “sisters are female" and
“F =m a" might not be a sharp one anyway. Thus, the project of finding a genuine
metaphysically necessary law — as opposed to just a metaphysically necessary
proposition — is perhaps after all not so well-defined.)
4 Naturalized metaphysics from physics?
It is a common point that one should take recourse to our best physically theories,
namely (classical) GR on the gravitational side, and the standard model on the matter
sector (formulated in the framework of quantum field theory) when trying to inform
metaphysics from physics (see for instance Ladyman et al. (2007)). Although Wolff
seems to suggest that she is actually looking at matters on the quantum level, the
example from quantum electrodynamics she cites is strictly speaking only studied at
the classical relativistic level both in the original source Brading (2002) and in her own
work.
Admittedly, at the end of her paper, Wolff does consider what she calls “a piece of
linguistic evidence" from talk in quantum field theory for her claim that (certain
instances of) conservation laws are metaphysically necessary:
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“In modern quantum field theories, it is quite common to call charges the
generators of the local symmetry groups (Martin 2003), which suggests that
we should say that electric charge, for example, is conserved in virtue of
what charge is, not in virtue of something else, like the equations of motion.
Electric charge is conserved because it is a generator of a particular
continuous symmetry group, U(1), and the color charge of quarks is
conserved because it is the generator of a different symmetry group, SU(2)."
(p. 902)
The standard context for this sort of linguistic practice is quantum field theory in a
Hamiltonian operator picture (whereas so far, we have only been concerned with
classical relativistic field theory in a Lagrangian formulation).18
But Wolff’s analysis of this way of speaking is mistaken, and, in particular, does not
allow for the conclusion that conservation of these charges — which are indeed Noether
charges19— should count as metaphysically necessary laws.
The core problem is that the quoted paragraph overlooks the fact that — within the
18The Hamiltonian operator formulation is the result of applying the canonical
quantization prescription to relativistic field theory in a classical relativistic
Hamiltonian formulation. Just as the Hamiltonian formulation is less general than the
Lagrangian formulation (see Curiel (2013)), the Hamiltonian operator formulation is
less general than the (Lagrangian-based) path integral formulation (see Rovelli and
Vidotto (2014)).
19The Hamiltonian version of Noether’s theorem is invoked here. Cf. for instance
Butterfield (2006).
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Hamiltonian framework — the depiction of (conserved) charges as generators of
symmetries already presupposes that the Hamiltonian is the generator of time evolution
which is however equivalent to requiring the equations of motion to hold (cf.
(Butterfield, 2006, p. 36)). To spell this out a bit more: (a) A charge Q that is
conserved over time obeys dQ
dt
= 0 (in the quantum picture, that is dQˆ
dt
= 0). (b) To say
that the charge Q is a generator of a symmetry of a system, amounts to saying that it
leaves the Hamiltonian H invariant, that is {Q,H} = 0 (in the quantum operator
formulation, that is [Qˆ, Hˆ] = 0). But linking (a) and (b) requires interpreting H as the
generator of motion: df
dt
= {H, f} (in the quantum picture, dfˆ
dt
= i
h¯
[Hˆ, fˆ ]).20 This, on
the classical level, implies that the equations of motion are fulfilled, and, on the
quantum level, defines time evolution in the Heisenberg picture in the first place (via
the Heisenberg equation of motion). Only if dQ
dt
= {H,Q} (in the quantum picture,
dQˆ
dt
= i
h¯
[Hˆ, Qˆ]), (a) and (b) are equivalent. Again, conserved charges supposedly
counting as metaphysically necessary conservation laws have been revealed to only hold
in virtue of state of affairs which we (including Wolff) would at the same time
acknowledge as going beyond the mere identity of the fields (or rather operators) at
play.
However, topological currents do indeed represent — as I have argued before —
physical conservation laws which are conserved by metaphysical necessity on Fine’s
account, at least at the classical level. And luckily, taking over classical conservation
charges to the quantum turns out to be straightforward: In brief, upon quantization,
20I ignore — as usually done — explicitly time-dependent phase space
functions/operators here.
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the current jµ will be promoted to an operator jˆµ which is only conserved on the level
of the quantum expectation value, that is ∂µ〈jˆµ〉 = 0. So the notion of topological
current as discussed in the classical relativistic context does generally carry over to a
corresponding notion of a topological current in the quantum field theory context.
But even if metaphysically necessary laws (in the form of conservation of topological
currents) are realized in a framework in which a large part of our best physical theories
are formulated (the other one is general relativity), it is not thereby clear that they are
actually realized in the best physical theories themselves. The examples of topological
currents given before carry over to the framework of quantum field theory. But in
absence of a good example from the standard model itself, one would have to accept
that consideration of the framework of our best physical theories (rather than of our
best physical theories themselves) is sufficient for illustrating on what is naturally
possible and what is naturally necessary in order to accept the importance of
conservation laws based on topological currents as metaphysically necessary laws of
physics.
5 Conclusion
Wolff (2013) is correct in that the species view of Fine (2002) can indeed be illustrated
by reference to laws from modern relativistic (quantum) field theory. However, as I
have tried to demonstrate, her particular execution of this strategy fails. The right path
to an example of metaphysically necessary laws of physics (in the Finean sense), I have
argued, is via the notion of topological currents rather than via Noether currents,
together with a kinematical essentialism on fields.
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